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Abstract The manufacturing industry is characterized by
large-scale interdependent networks as companies buy
goods from one another, but do not control or design the
overall flow of materials. The result is a complex emergent
structure with which companies connect to each other. The
topology of this structure impacts the industry’s robustness
to disruptions in companies, countries, and regions. In this
work, we propose an analysis framework for examining
robustness in the manufacturing industry and validate it
using an empirical dataset. Focusing on two key angles,
suppliers and products, we highlight macroscopic and
microscopic characteristics of the network and shed light
on vulnerabilities of the system. It is shown that large-scale
data on structural interdependencies can be examined with
measures based on network science.
Keywords Complex network  Supply  Manufacturing 
Robustness
1 Introduction and background
A supply network is created when companies buy and sell
goods to each other, transferring necessary parts down-
stream to create a final product. Often, companies do not
have visibility beyond their immediate buyers and suppli-
ers, which results that these networks are not designed but
emerge [10]. These networks can become large scale, with
many thousands of companies becoming interdependent
without their knowledge of being so. Due to these inter-
dependencies, disruptions in the network can cascade, and
the implications can be catastrophic. For example, the
March 2011 Tohoku earthquake caused the Japanese auto
industry to temporarily shut down, forcing European and
North American manufacturers to halt production as their
inventories from Japan were exhausted. Goldman Sachs
estimated that the shutdowns cost Japanese automakers 200
million USD a day [17]. Daily global automotive produc-
tion dropped by one-third, resulting in an overall loss of 5
million vehicles worldwide, out of the 72 million planned
for 2011 (*7 % loss). Both in terms of risk management
for the entire network, and from the perspective of indi-
vidual firms planning and coordinating with different
suppliers, a better understanding of interdependencies
would help create better strategies for robustness.
The field of supply chain planning has a long history of
creating sophisticated operational models that describe the
flow of materials between organizations. While these
models capture low-level dynamics with accuracy, they
increasingly lose accuracy and become hard to construct as
system size grows. Typical simulation and analytical
models include detailed state variables of each individual
production step such as inventory levels, bills of materials,
throughput, and lead times for production. In the context of
robustness to failures, several inventory and optimization
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models have been proposed [9, 26, 28]. However, these
models cannot be extended to include the whole system
because state variables are often not available because of a
lack of visibility and unwillingness of suppliers to share
data. Furthermore, these models are not practical for
implementation at large scales due to computational limi-
tations and the frequency with which state variables
change. Several researchers have stressed the need for
alternative methods to analyse system robustness that can
complement low-level dynamical analysis (an excellent
review can be found by Snyder et al. [24]). This inevitably
means letting go of local detail, and focusing on statistical
properties of the system.
In this respect, the last decade has seen the emergence of
a substantial body of techniques under the broad heading of
‘‘network science’’ ([27], [21]), which provides tools for
understanding the characteristics of large-scale networks
and complex systems. Network science abstracts systems
as a set of nodes and links, the former representing agents
(such as companies), and the latter interactions among
them (such as buy and sell relationships). In doing so, it
reveals structure and infers the governing rules of the
system. This development meant that supply networks
could now be analysed as a whole system rather than iso-
lated parts.
Choi et al. [10] pioneered the application of these ideas
to supply networks (see also [5, 8, 14]). Empirical studies
include Kim et al. [16] efforts to map part of the Honda,
Acura, and Daimler Chrysler, which consisted of 70
members; Lomi and Pattison [18] analysis of 106 auto-
motive firms in southern Italy; and Keqiang et al. [15]
examination of the Guangzhou automotive industry,
Saveedra et al. [23] study on the New York Garment
Industry, and Brintrup et al. [7] study on Airbus. These
studies examined network structure and proved that supply
networks are complex systems and that their robustness
properties would be affected by structure, but did not find
empirical consensus on universal properties ([12], Brintrup
et al. [7]).
The above studies on large-scale supply networks force
us to revisit long assumed models of isolated parts and
think about the bigger system picture when robustness is
examined. In this respect, Thadakamaila et al. [25] used the
preferential attachment model to generate a scale-free
network, from which they interpreted robustness proper-
ties. Nair and Vidal [19] examined robustness against
disruptions under random, small-world, and scale-free
network topologies using multi-agent simulation. Zeng and
Xiao [29] proposed network load entropy as a measure to
detect spreading dynamics of cluster supply chain networks
under cascading failures. Basole and Bellamy [3] applied
the classical SIR model from epidemiology for under-
standing risk diffusion in supply networks.
As previous researchers demonstrated, network science
is a promising approach in modelling whole system
robustness in supply networks. However, the extant liter-
ature ignored a crucial ingredient for modelling supply
network robustness, which is their dualistic topology,
containing (1) the structure with which suppliers connect to
each other and (2) the structure with which production is
distributed among suppliers. A supplier might be in a
periphery position in the network, but its product list might
contain products that are unique. Hence, network mod-
elling based only on supplier connections would not cap-
ture this supplier as an important node, although
disruptions in this supplier would halt the production of an
assembly. For a supply network to be robust, not only the
supplier connections should remain intact, but also all
products needed for an assembly should subsist.
In this article, we close this gap by proposing a com-
prehensive framework for the analysis of robustness in
supply networks. The framework borrows ideas from net-
work science extending them within the supply network
context for both static and dynamic assessment of robust-
ness. Firstly, the dualistic supplier–product perspective is
created. Then, a review of network disruption scenarios is
collated and modelled. This is followed by the develop-
ment of damage assessment measures, which help identify
the impact of disruption scenarios. The framework is then
tested using large-scale empirical data from the global
automotive industry.
2 A framework for robustness assessment
in supply networks
2.1 Two perspectives
The framework we propose includes two distinct modes of
analysis: structural and simulation based. The structural
analysis includes the examination of as-is topology,
whereas the simulation-based analysis includes subjecting
the topology to disruption scenarios and extracting statis-
tical properties relating to possible failure types. Both
structural and simulation-based analysis include examining
two key perspectives of supply networks, which are inter-
twined, but their connection has been hitherto ignored in
the literature.
2.1.1 Supplier network
As Kim et al. [16] point out, links in a supply network
can be of various forms, including contractual relation-
ships and material flow. It might be that companies have
a contractual obligation to an assembler to deliver certain
goods, but the physical goods come from another
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company. As our query is on the robustness of the net-
work, links of actual goods delivery are of interest. If
these companies fail, then the final assembly cannot be
completed. One can also argue that if a contracted com-
pany is disrupted, this would affect the flow of goods just
as much as the disruption at the physical goods producer,
as it essentially acts as an intermediary to deliver goods
downstream. In that case, the assembler needs to find the
producer and procure directly. Another argument would
be the consideration of the logistics network. More often
than not, producers rely on external logistics and ware-
housing providers to deliver goods downstream. If dis-
ruptions occur in these intermediaries, the supply network
would fail. The producers would need to find alternative
modes of transportation and storage. For the sake of
simplicity, in this paper we focus on the physical pro-
duction network between companies and capture the most
dramatic disruption mechanism—that of failures of pro-
ducers. Hence, in this network nodes represent production
companies, and directional links capture material flow
relationships between them. Each node is assigned a
vector of products that it offers. Topology of this network
defines its robustness to company failures. Let us call this
perspective a supplier network.
2.1.2 Product network
In a supply network, there are interdependencies between
components that make sub-systems, which themselves
make an assembly. An actual bill of materials map would
be the most accurate representation in understanding how
products traverse in the system and come together to make
up the assembly. However, in large-scale supply networks,
as companies entrust each other with sub-assemblies, they
do not necessarily have visibility of the entire sub-system
down to the component level. In the absence of such data,
other forms of representation must be used to approximate
interdependencies between products. We thus propose a
representation where each product category that exists in
the network is represented by a node. The more two
products occur within the same supplier, the more likely
these two products would be related and interdependent.
Nodes are connected to one another if they coexist in a
supplier’s product portfolio. The total weight w on a link
represents how many times the two products co-occur in
the same portfolios. In other words, w C 1, where w is an
integer. We shall use the term product as an all-encom-
passing term that includes sub-components and sub-sys-
tems (please see Table 4 for examples). Thus, this network
perspective helps us understand potential relationships
among product categories. Let us call this perspective a
product network.
Clearly, for robustness in a supply network the two
perspectives cannot be separated because each node pro-
duces one or more types of products and supplies them to
other firms, eventually ending with the manufacturer,
which assembles the products. For a supply network to
remain functional, both the supplier and product network
should be robust and contain redundancies at system level.
In subsequent sections, both these perspectives are used for
the assessment of robustness.
2.2 Structural analysis
The field of network science offers a toolset to analyse
topology with respect to robustness, using a minimal set of
parameters, in the form of nodes and links. In what follows,
we use and explain some relevant measures reported in the
literature and propose new ones to capture intricacies of
supply networks (Table 1). In both supplier and product
network perspectives, both the network (system) level and
the node (company or product) level are analysed. The first
present us with a macroscopic view of how the network is
interconnected, pinpointing structural vulnerabilities. The
second examines how key actors and their roles can be
identified using centrality measures, which help understand
suppliers that act as network connectors, integrators, and
mediators. In the case of the product network, the network
level helps understanding the interconnectivity and scarcity
of products, while the node level helps identify products
that are most frequently used for the assembly and bring
together various different sub-systems.
2.2.1 Supplier network metrics: in-, out-, total degree
centralities and distributions
These measures refer to the number and distribution of
relationships across firms in the network. Since supply
networks are directed networks, we can distinguish
between in- and out-degree centralities, with the first
being the number of suppliers a company has, and the
latter being the number of clients a company has. Nodes
with high in-degree centrality are integrators that assem-
ble components that go into a final product and are inte-
gral to the architectural design of the product, whereas
nodes with high out-degree centrality are concerned with
distributing limited resources among several customers
(Kim et al. [16]). High in-degree centrality relates to a
firm’s supply load, whereas high out-degree centrality
relates to its demand load (Kim et al. [16]). The total
degree is the number of clients and suppliers a node has.
Distributions are plots showing the frequencies of these
centralities across the network and are used to highlight
variations. A homogeneous distribution would show that
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most suppliers have similar numbers of relationships,
affecting the overall connectivity in similar ways. A
heterogeneous distribution would mean some suppliers
affect connectivity more than others. Degree, in-degree
and out-degree are defined as:
ki ¼
Xn
j¼1
Aij ð1Þ
kini ¼
Xn
j¼1
Aij ð2Þ
kouti ¼
Xn
i¼1
Aij ð3Þ
where Aij corresponds to the element (ith and jth) of the
adjacency matrix. The event, or probability of outcome, of
degree k can be represented by:
pk ¼ nk
n
ð4Þ
where nk is the number of nodes with degree k, and n is the
number of all nodes in the network. The degree distribution
can be analysed in a (k, pk) plot.
2.2.2 Average path length
The average path length is the sum of lengths of shortest
path between all nodes divided by the number of all pairs,
defined as [21]:
l ¼ 1
n2
X
ij
dij ð5Þ
where dij is the shortest path length between vertices i and
j, and n is the number of nodes in the network. It can be
associated with the distance the products and materials
need to travel on average. Here a path refers to a geodesic
path, meaning the number of nodes one must traverse to
reach to a destination; and is not related to actual distance.
The shorter the average path length, the more efficient the
flow of materials will be (Kim et al. [16], [6]).
2.2.3 Clustering coefficient
This metric quantifies the extent to which two random
nodes with links between them are also connected through
common third parties and is defined as the ratio of the
number of existing links between a given node’s nearest
neighbours and the maximum possible number of such
links, averaged over all nodes in the network. Clustering
coefficient is defined as:
C ¼ 1
n
k2  k½ 2
k3
ð6Þ
where n is number of nodes in the network, and kmh i is kth
moment defined as:
hkmi ¼
X1
k¼0
kmpk ð7Þ
Table 1 Metrics used for structural analysis of the supplier and product networks
Supplier network Product network
Node Company Product
Link ‘‘Supplies to’’ ‘‘Jointly supplied by’’
Properties Directional, unweighted Bidirectional, weighted
Most relevant network-level metrics In-, out-, total degree distribution
Assortativity
Modularity
Average path length
Clustering coefficient
Weighted degree distribution
Most relevant node-level metrics In-, out-, total degree centrality
Betweenness centrality
Closeness centrality
Degree centrality
Betweenness centrality
Closeness centrality
Additional metrics proposed Product degree distribution (network level)
Product centrality (node level)
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where k is the degree of the network and pk is the degree
distribution. From a robustness perspective, the higher the
clustering coefficient, the more dependent suppliers are on
each other for production.
2.2.4 Modularity
Network structure can be affected from geographical and
industrial influences, forming into substructures called
communities. Modularity essentially investigates the good-
ness of specific subgroup formations in a network. Biological
and social networks have been shown to have high modu-
larity [20]. Communities are important in understanding the
dynamics of a network. For instance, in epidemiology the
resistance of connections between communities determine
the rate of transfer of diseases throughout the network of
humans. Similarly, in a supply network,modularity can point
to the extent where failures can be contained within com-
munities. Modularity is defined as:
Q ¼ 1
2m
X
ij
Aij  kikj
2m
 
d ci; cj
  ð8Þ
where m is the number of edges, Aij is the element in the
adjacency matrix in the ith row and jth column, k is the
degree of the node, and d(ci,cj) is the Kroneker delta, which
is 1 if two nodes belong to the same community, 0 other-
wise. Modularity has its maximum at Q = 1, where all
nodes are separated into communities. If Q = 0, the whole
network becomes a single community. We use the popular
community detection method described by Girvan and
Newman [13].
2.2.5 Assortativity
Social networks have been observed to show ‘‘assortative
mixing’’, which means that high-degree nodes have a ten-
dency to connect to other high-degree nodes. The concept is
important as something that affects a single high-degree
node could quickly cascade to other high-degree nodes. For
example, in the field of epidemiology an assortative network
means that diseases will spread faster than disassortative
networks, whereas in the latter type of network targeting
vaccinations to high-degree nodes, i.e. persons with a large
social network, would be an effective strategy. To charac-
terize assortativity, the behaviour of the average nearest
neighbour’s degree of the firms of degree k is studied:
knnðkÞ 
X
k0
k0Pðk0jkÞ ð9Þ
where P(k0|k) is the conditional probability that a firm of
degree k is connected to a firm of degree k0. Here k includes
both suppliers and customers and thus considers all firms
connected to the node in question. If knn increases with k,
the network is assortative. If knn decreases with k, network
is disassortative. Assortativity could point to several
dynamics at play in a supply network. Firms with high
numbers of links could be managing sub-communities in
certain areas of production and then connect to other high-
degree firms doing the same thing, creating subassemblies
that they pass on downstream. Although efficient, the
structure also would mean that disruptions at any one of the
connector nodes could bring the whole network to a
standstill quickly, as they will quickly cascade to other
high-degree nodes.
2.2.6 Closeness centrality
This metric provides a measure of how close a firm is to
other firms in the network by counting the total geodesic
distance between a node and all other nodes in the network.
This could be used as a proxy for the speed with which
disruptions from a disrupted node can affect others.
Closeness centrality is defined as:
Ci ¼ nP
j dij
ð10Þ
where n is the number of nodes and dij is the length of the
shortest path between vertices i and j.
2.2.7 Betweenness centrality
This metric measures how often a node will sit on the
shortest paths that connect different nodes to each other in
the network. Nodes with high betweenness centrality have
been shown to control the flow of materials and commu-
nication in the network (Kim et al. [16]). Consequently,
they can control the speed with which information and
material can be disseminated in the network and act as
bottlenecks during disruptions. Kim et al. [16] relate
betweenness centrality to a firm’s operational criticality. It
is important to point out that betweenness centrality counts
shortest paths, whereas all paths are in use in a supply
network as firms work towards a bill of materials. A more
refined measure should include all the paths; however, in
this paper we base our discussions on the conventional
definition of this measure so that comparisons with other
empirical work can be made by researchers. Betweenness
centrality is defined as:
xi ¼
X
st
nist
g
st
ð11Þ
where nist is 1 if vertex i lies on the shortest path between
s and t, and gst is the number of all shortest paths between
s and t.
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The following two metrics we propose complementing
the supplier network by examining how products are con-
nected to suppliers in the form of a bipartite network.
2.2.8 Product centrality
We propose that disruptions at companies with large num-
bers of product types would have a higher impact on the
network than companies with small numbers of product
types, and we propose to measure the number of product
types that each company has. Here a product is used to refer
to distinct product categories that make up an assembly,
rather than inventories of products. Product categorization
could be a rather subjective measure that reflects a scale
instead of distinct types. For example, a distinction can be
made between diesel and petrol engines, or between slightly
different enginemodels. The level of differentiation between
categories would need expert input and consideration of
substitutions between categories. For example, product cat-
egories that can be substituted between each other can be
bundled together to demonstrate redundancies in the net-
work. Product centrality can be defined as:
pci ¼
X
j
nij ð12Þ
where pci is the product centrality of vertex i, nij is 1 when
company i has product j, 0 otherwise.
2.2.9 Product degree distribution
We propose this measure to capture the variations among
suppliers’ product portfolio sizes. A homogeneous distri-
bution would show that most suppliers have similar num-
bers of products, affecting the overall assembly in similar
way. A heterogeneous distribution would mean some
suppliers affect the assembly more than others. Product
degree distribution is defined as:
ppc ¼ npc
n
ð13Þ
where npc is the number of companies with product cen-
trality pc and n is the number of nodes in the network.
A summary of each metric and its relevance is given in
Table 2.
Table 2 Description of metrics used for structural analysis
Metrics Description
Supplier network
In-, out-, total degree distribution A homogeneous distribution shows most suppliers affect overall connectivity in similar ways. A
heterogeneous distribution means some suppliers affect connectivity more than others
Assortativity Assortative network means disruptions at any one of the connector nodes can halt production quickly, as they
will quickly cascade to other high-degree nodes
Modularity Modularity can point to the extent where failures can be contained within communities
Average path length The shorter the average path length, the more efficient the flow of materials
Clustering coefficient The higher the clustering coefficient, the more dependent suppliers are on each other for production
Total degree centrality Integrators that assemble components
In-degree centrality Supply load
Out-degree centrality Demand load
Betweenness centrality The speed with which information and material can be disseminated in the network and suppliers that act as
bottlenecks during disruptions
Closeness centrality Speed with which disruptions from a disrupted node can affect others
Product degree distribution
(network level)
A homogeneous distribution shows most suppliers have similar numbers of products, affecting the overall
assembly in similar way
Product centrality (node level) Companies with large numbers of product types would have a higher impact on the network than companies
with small numbers of product types
Product network
Weighted degree distribution Ubiquity of products. Highly ubiquitous products are least likely to disappear, but can cause a lot of
disruptions, as many components including this product cannot be made
Degree centrality Redundancy of a product in the network
Betweenness centrality High betweenness centrality for a product highlights how commonly it is needed to bring sub-systems
together
Closeness centrality High closeness centrality relates to how soon product would be needed to create other products in the
network, and how soon its lack would affect the making of the assembly
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2.2.10 Product network metrics: weighted degree
distribution
We propose to examine the likelihood of a product to be
coupled with other products in a supplier’s portfolio. A
large weight represents a ubiquitous product, and although
its lack would affect many suppliers, its ubiquity means
there will be many instances of it across the network.
While least likely to disappear, if a product with a large
degree disappears, it can cause a lot of disruptions, as many
components including this product cannot be made. Here
the frequency of weights across the product network are
plotted to highlight variations.
2.2.11 Degree centrality
Similar to the supplier network, here we measure the
number of connections a node has. The connections refer to
the number of companies co-producing that product. If a
node has no connections, the product is made by only one
supplier. If it has many connections, the product is made by
multiple suppliers. The degree centrality therefore can be
an indicator of the redundancy of the product in the
network.
2.2.12 Betweenness centrality
In the context of the product network, this measure
accounts for the number of times a product sits on shortest
paths between products. As the paths represent interrelat-
edness in this network, the closer products are to each
other, the more interrelated they will be. High betweenness
centrality for a product can thus highlight how ubiquitously
it is needed to bring sub-systems together.
2.2.13 Closeness centrality
In the context of the product network, this measure
accounts for the distance a product is from other products.
A high closeness centrality would relate to how soon this
product would be needed to create various other products
in the network, and how soon its lack would affect the
making of the assembly.
2.3 Risk scenarios
Research has shown that supply networks face various
types of risks whose frequency and impact severity differ
widely [22]. Analysing the relationship between network
structure and risk scenario should therefore involve linking
risk scenarios into their structural impact and thus outlining
how the impact can be simulated.
Table 3 shows a variety of risk scenarios gathered from
the literature. Although this is not a comprehensive list, a
variety of examples can be considered in this vein. For
example, a natural catastrophe such as a volcano eruption
would affect a region or a country. To simulate the effect of
the eruption on the network, all companies that fall within
Table 3 Risk scenarios in the supplier network
Risk scenarios Impact level Simulation procedure Damage
assessment
Attack
scenarios
Humanitarian crisis
Political violence
Geopolitical conflicts
Climate catastrophe
Disease outbreak
Natural/environmental
catastrophe
Region/country Remove all companies in the country or countries and
associated product instances
LCC
APL
AC
CFP
CFC
Targeted
single
Financial issues
Reputation damage
Group of
companies
Remove all companies and associated product instances Random single
Hazard on premises Factory Remove company location and associated product instances Targeted
Financial issues
Quality issues
Reputation damage
Company Remove company and associated product instances
Machine breakdowns
Quality issues
Resource scarcity
Product
instance
Remove product instance from the network AC Progressive
Resource scarcity Product type Remove all product instances associated with a product type
from the network
Random
progressive
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the impacted region or country are removed from the net-
work along with the products they supply. Financial issues
such as bankruptcy can affect a group of companies that
belong to the same corporation. These can be simulated by
removing all companies that belong to the impacted cor-
poration. Similarly, problems at a factory such as a fire
hazard at a premise or at a company as a whole entity such
as damaged reputation can be simulated by removing sin-
gular premises or companies.
An important difference needs to be made between
product types and product instances. A product type is a
category of products that needs to exist in the network for
an assembly to be made. If a given product category no
longer exists in the network, the assembly cannot be made,
and hence, the production fails. A product instance, on the
other hand, is a specific realization of a product category
within a supplier’s portfolio of products. The more
instances of a product category there is in the network, the
more robust the network would be. When a supplier is
disrupted, the product instances that it holds in the network
are no longer available. On the other hand, it is possible
that a single product instance only is affected. For example,
problems in a single production line such as the breakdown
of a machine can mean that a certain product instance, say
a gearbox from a supplier, is not available; however, the
other products of the supplier are. It is also possible that a
product category, capturing all gearboxes in the network, is
no longer available, because a certain raw material neces-
sary to make the product can no longer be sourced. In this
scenario, all product categories that contain this raw
material would cease to exist in the network.
To evaluate the impact of the different risk scenarios, we
adopt a computational procedure which involves ‘‘stress
testing’’ the network by assessing how the system would
cope with failures, a summary of which is given in Table 3.
The stress testing involves triggering a potential crisis by
exogenously failing a node and investigates the spread of
this failure within the system. Failing a node does not
imply physical removal but that the node is dysfunctional
in some way. To investigate maximum impact, we make
sure the nodes that fail do not become functional, but
remain dysfunctional throughout the simulation period.
Simulation can be undertaken in many ways. In the
simplest case, a single attack is carried out at random.
Depending on the risk scenario under consideration, this
could be a company, a product instance, a whole product
category, a whole country, or group of companies. This
would help answer questions such as:
• Wouldmy network function if there was a freeze event in
northern Europe, disrupting all companies in this region?
Another option might be progressive removal. Here, the
network is repeatedly attacked by random removal of
nodes, until the network fails. This would help understand
the failure threshold of the network and answer questions
such as:
• How many companies need to be disrupted at random
before my network ceases to function?
A popular alternative to random removal is targeted
removal, during which a node or set of nodes are attacked
according to some criterion. The criterion could include a
ranking order with respect to a node’s centrality. Again,
under this attack type, removal can be progressive or tar-
geted at a single node. Targeted progressive removal would
put the network under the most pressure, as the network is
attacked using intelligent choices. Research has shown that
different network structures respond to attack types dif-
ferently. In scale-free networks, the network remains con-
nected in the face of random disruptions as these will most
likely affect those firms that connect to large hubs. If, on
the other hand, large hub firms are disrupted, the overall
network will most likely suffer, given that they are integral
to the functioning of the network (Baraba´si and Albert [2]).
2.4 Damage assessment
Following risk and attack scenarios, a procedure for
detecting network failure needs to be established. There are
several damage assessment measures that could be used to
detect when a network fails. Of these, most used are de-
crease of size of the largest connected component (LCC)
and increase of the average path length (APL) (Table 3).
A component is composed of nodes that are directly or
indirectly connected to each other. The LCC contains the
highest number of nodes that are connected to each other.
The criterion of size decrease therefore investigates how
fast a network becomes disconnected into isolated clusters,
and there is no longer a guarantee that two random nodes
will be connected through traversing intermediary nodes.
This metric is useful in networks such as the Internet or
social networks. In supply networks, the measure can be
useful to understand the extent of the contracted, estab-
lished network. However, unlike communication networks,
the existence of disconnected clusters does not mean that
companies cannot procure goods from them. Existing
contracts allow companies to simply rewire their network
to procure goods from elsewhere. The measure thus could
be useful to identify when, on average, the network will
need to be reorganized.
The second measure, APL, investigates how the average
path, which must be traversed by products to reach to the
assembler, increases in length, as nodes are deleted. If the
network is disconnected, APL becomes infinitely long.
This is a somewhat useful measure for supply networks, as
the addition of each node on the average path will mean an
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additional contract and thus increased transaction cost and
time for the procurement of products.
While informing to some extent, none of the above
measures readily capture the intricacies of supply networks
during robustness analysis. We thus introduce an additional
damage assessment measure, called assembly completeness
(AC) (Table 3), which is concerned with the product dis-
tribution on the network. To build a final assembly, in this
case a car, all product categories that are necessary for the
assembly to be built need to come together. Hence, there
needs to be at least one instance of each product category
that is necessary for the assembly in the network. This
criterion therefore analyses how quickly the network loses
the ability to build an assembly under sustained failure. Let
us define assembly completeness ci as:
ci ¼
p pi
p
; ð14Þ
where p is the total number of product categories that are
needed in the network; pi is the number of product cate-
gories that supplier i produces.
LCC and APL could be examined during removal of
nodes that represent companies or products, as these
examine the connectance of the topology of the network,
whereas AC is applicable throughout.
Another consideration we propose is cascades of failures.
A cascading failure is a failure that can trigger the failure of
successive parts in a given system. In ours, a supplier’s
failure can cause other suppliers to fail in delivery of their
goods, cascading throughout the network. Two measures of
cascading failure can be considered here: cascading failures
of companies (CFC) and their products (CFP) (Table 3).
CFCmeasures howmany firms fail due to the disruption of a
single company. CFC can be considered by a company’s
level of impact on the environment, from first degree of
cascades, where the removed company affects its customers
and suppliers, second degree, where neighbours of neigh-
bours of removed company are considered, and so on. CPC
takes the products portfolios of these companies into
account, measuring the theoretical maximum number of
products that can be affected.We followed (Costa et al. [11])
to formulate the CFC and CFP concepts. Consider a bidi-
rectional network build from our direct network that is rep-
resented by g ¼def n!; l
!
; p
! 
, where n is the list of nodes, l is the
list of links, and p is the list of products. Such as, p1 is the list
of products belonging to the company n1. Hence, if we want
to analyse a cascading effect starting in node, n1, we have to
define first the radius Rik. Radius R
1
1 is the list of nodes sep-
arated by distance 1 of node 1:
R11 ¼ ni 2 g : d n1; nið Þ ¼ 1f g ð15Þ
Then, to determine the nodes at radius d = 2 from node n1,
i.e. R12, we need to remove all elements from R
1
1:
R12 ¼ ni 2 gnRi1 : d n1; nið Þ ¼ 2
 	 ð16Þ
So in general, for a distance k from a node i:
Rik ¼ ni 2 gnRik1 : d ni; nkð Þ ¼ k
 	 ð17Þ
Now, to obtain a quantity for the number of cascading
failing companies, we just need to write the cascading
number C, for a cascade range of k layers starting at node i,
which is the sum of the number of elements of each radius:
Cik ¼
X
k
#Rik ð18Þ
In the same way, for the cascading of products, the union of
the lists of products in each set of companies belonging to
each radius is:
Pik ¼
[
j
pj : nj 2 Rik
 	 ð19Þ
To write the full list of products that belong to all failing
companies put together, we have the union of products of
every company at distance k from node i. So, all cascading
products are the union of this union for all distances:
Pi ¼
[
k
Pik ð20Þ
and the total number of products unavailable, is then
simply #Pi.
In the product network described earlier, risk scenarios
can be represented in a similar vein. Each weight repre-
sents a product instance. By reducing weights from the
links, we can observe risks relating to the disappearance of
individual products from suppliers’ portfolios. To simulate
resource scarcity, we would need to delete a node. To
simulate disruptions at companies, the weights of all links
associated with products in a supplier’s portfolio are
reduced. If a product node becomes isolated, this means the
product is no longer reachable. However, in the product
network isolated company nodes cannot be observed
readily. Hence, we shall use the supply network for the
simulation of risk scenarios.
3 An empirical illustration: the global automotive
industry
In this section, we test a part of the risk assessment
framework proposed in the previous section using large-
scale empirical data. First, the dataset and network creation
are described, followed by topological and simulation-
based analysis.
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3.1 Data and methods
To illustrate the analysis proposed, the automotive industry
is mapped by querying a private industry database
(Marklines Automotive Information Platform). The data-
base collects data populated through surveys sent to about
40,000 automotive supplier firms and is primarily used by
member firms to search for suppliers and advertise their
capabilities. The data are agglomerative, in that once a
supplier has identified itself as a supplier to a certain firm,
it will remain so, unless either the customer firm or the
supplier firm requests a removal of the relationship from
the database. Therefore, the data are cross-sectional and
might show relationships that are not continuous, although
most data were gathered after 2007.
Data were downloaded from the databases during
August–October 2014. The search process involved
downloading data on products, customers and suppliers of
firms that advertise themselves on the database. The cus-
tomer and supplier data were then used to create links
between companies. Every supplier was coded with a
unique identification. Hence inter-tier linkages, and sup-
plier links to multiple clients could be identified. First, the
supplier network was constructed. Following data collec-
tion and the creation of the network, we isolated the largest
connected component, ignoring clusters of firms that are
not connected to the network. This resulted in 18,943
companies with 103,632 links between them. Of these,
16,469 are suppliers and the remainders are assemblers.
One of the challenges in modelling supply networks is to
define its boundaries. The companies on the network view
themselves as connected to the automotive industry, given
that they advertise their services to this particular industry.
This, however, could mean companies such as raw material
producers are missing from the network. The dataset also
does not include non-production suppliers (for example,
those providing maintenance, repair, and operating sup-
plies, or capital equipment).
After the construction of the supplier network, we
construct the product network by listing all distinctive
product categories advertised by the suppliers and then
creating linkages between the products with weights that
signify how many times a product pair appears in the same
portfolios of suppliers. There are a total of 934 product
types in the network, produced by 16,469 supplier firms.
The products listed by companies are chosen from
standard categories provided by the database and hence are
consistent. A product refers to one of the product categories
in the network, which are generic automobile components
and sub-systems, rather than model specific. These could
include categories such as gearbox, air conditioner, wiper
switch. Product categories are thus viewed as substitutable.
Generic processing capabilities such as forging and plastic
moulding were ignored. Our view is that suppliers that
create these generic product categories could be substi-
tutable as they have the general capability and tools to
produce a given product.
The networks constructed are shown in Fig. 1. The open
source graph visualization manipulation software Gephi
(available at http://gephi.org/) was used to visualize the
two networks. Gephi was used also to identify network-
and node-level metrics. The metrics proposed by the
authors and simulation scenarios were implemented using
the JGraphT library. The simulation experiments were
carried out on two 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 Apple computers
with 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory. To achieve statis-
tically significant results, we compared topological metrics
with 100 random realizations of networks of the same
numbers of nodes and links. The random realizations are
created using Gephi, based on Erd}os and Re´nyi networks
(Erd}os and Re´nyi 1960). Of course, a random network is
likely to be a poor match with real supply chains.
Fig. 1 a Supplier and b product
networks constructed. Nodes are
colour-coded according to
communities
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However, given that there is a lack of real-world
empirical data in the supply chain literature, it is not
appropriate to speculate on alternative null models without
having to resort to significant assumptions. Similarly, there
is no empirical example of the product network represen-
tation in the literature, and thus, no assumptions can be
made regarding its structure.
3.2 Structural analysis of the global automotive
industry
Table 4 shows metrics obtained for the automotive supplier
network. The network is assortative as there is a clear
increase in knn as k grows and the correlation between k and
knn is reasonably high (Fig. 3e). Assortativity could point
to several dynamics at play in a supply network. It could be
an artefact of a bill of materials flow. Firms with high
numbers of links could be leading their communities in
certain areas of production and then connect to other high-
degree firms doing the same thing, creating sub-assemblies
that they pass on downstream. From a robustness per-
spective, connection of hubs to hubs would mean disrup-
tions can cascade faster than a non-assortative network.
This would pinpoint a need to keep contingency plans in
place at hubs, such as inventories from vulnerable
suppliers.
Modularity is high in our network and close to that of
networks reported in the literature, including metabolic
networks, collaboration networks of scientists, and jazz
musicians [20]. We find 21 communities in the network
detected by the algorithm given in Blondel et al. [4].
Figure 1a shows the communities found. Although the
community detection algorithm does not have any
industrial intelligence embedded within it, it is able to
find logical patterns solely based on topological data. The
existence of communities in a network could act as a
buffer for disruptions as communities can prevent cas-
cades to leak outside.
Table 4 Supply and product network metrics
Global automotive industry Random network
Supply network
Network level
Assortativity
Modularity
Average path length
Clustering coefficient
Assortative (r = 0.52)
0.44
3.92
0.17
Disassortative
0.14 ± 1e-5
3.67 ± 0.001
0.001 ± 1e-7
Node level
In-degree centrality (supply load) Ford Motor Company (1), Toyota (0.93), Honda (0.88)
Out-degree centrality (demand load) Magna International (1), Robert Bosch GmbH(0.64), Denso Corporation (0.59)
Total degree centrality Ford Motor Company (1), Toyota (0.93), Honda (0.88)
Betweenness centrality (operational criticality) Toyota (1), Ford (1), Honda(1), General Motors(0.8), Nissan (0.7), China FAW (0.7)
Closeness centrality (informational independence) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Philippines (1), Sanko Electronics America (1), Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries
Product centrality (assembly criticality) Magna International Inc.(1), Denso Corporation(0.95), Robert Bosch GmbH (0.84), TRW
Automotive Holdings Corporation (0.66), Delphi Automotive PLC (0.65), Aisin Seiki
Co. Ltd. (0.64)
Product network
Network level
Assortativity
Modularity
Average path length
Clustering coefficient
Assortative (r = 0.76)
Not highly modular (0.179)
1.51
0.76
Disassortative
0.023 ± 1e-5
1.43 ± 0.001
0.57 ± 1e-7
Node level
Degree centrality Pipe (1), Bearing (0.97), Fastener (0.97), Spring (0.97), Sensor (0.96), Seal (0.95), Wire
Harness (0.95)
Betweenness centrality Pipe (1), Spring (0.82), Bearing (0.76), Wire Harness (0.76), Sensor (0.66), Fastener
(0.74)
Closeness centrality Fuel Filter (0.94), Fuel Gallery (0.92), Automatic Choke (0.92), Interior Trim (0.92)
Companies and products scoring highest in centrality measures are shown with normalized measures given in parentheses
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The average path length is not shorter than what we
would expect to occur by chance, as comparison with the
random model reveals. The supply network does not appear
to be tightly knit, on the whole. Though of course, specific
communities, perhaps those of some assemblers, might be
more closely positioned than others. However, the clus-
tering coefficient is higher than that of random networks,
meaning that companies are indirectly connected to one
another. Rather than the unitary pathways that would define
a strictly hierarchical network, a firm may have many
dozens of potential routes, whereby its output can reach the
final customer. The overall average number of connections
is 9.2. But here the issue is not the average number of links,
but the distribution of links, as shown in Fig. 2.
The distributions of in- , out- , and total number of links
demonstrate that the number of relationships maintained by
firms in the network is not characterized by some random
value, such as the Poisson distribution that we would
expect for a random network (Erd}os and Re´nyi 1960).
However, contrary to some prior claims about supply net-
works ([25, 30]), we do not find a power-law degree dis-
tribution as would be the case in a scale-free network [2]. A
scale-free structure would imply that a significant propor-
tion of all relationships are associated with firms that act as
hubs. Instead, the supply network follows an exponential
degree distribution, with some firms maintaining signifi-
cantly more relationships than others, but a clear upper
bound on how many relationships a firm can maintain. An
exponential degree distribution is typically observed in
networks generated by a trade-off evolutionary process that
involves nodes incurring costs for obtaining links [1]. This
would put the supplier network somewhere in between a
random network and a scale-free network in terms of its
robustness to random and targeted failures. While the
Fig. 2 Supply network distributions of a out-degree, b in-degree, c degree, d product degree, e assortativity and f product network weight
distribution
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network would be more robust to random failures than a
random network, it would not be as robust as a scale-free
network. On the other hand, it would be more robust to the
failures of nodes with high numbers of links than a scale-
free network, but not as robust as a random network.
Probabilities associated with such attacks can be found
using the simulation approach.
Product degree distribution shows a pattern in which
some firms sell many products and most firms sell a few
products. Although we cannot generalize a pattern to the
distribution, given its low scale, we can assert that failures
on those few firms with many products in their portfolio
will likely affect the network more, provided that there is
little redundancy. There is an average of 129 suppliers per
product category out of 16,469 suppliers that supply
products. Of course, this number is artificially high, as the
product categories we work with are generic. The product
weight distribution on the product network shows a dif-
ferent perspective (Fig. 2f). It appears that most product
categories have multiple suppliers associated with them;
however, a number of products are single- or double-
sourced (2 %). These products need to be carefully
inspected, and contingency plans for their scarcity need to
be developed.
Next, we investigate centrality measures in both net-
works. In the previous section, we showed that the overall
structure of the network is composed of hubs, to which
most firms are connected. The network is vulnerable to
disruptions on these hub firms but resistant to random
disruptions. Furthermore, the network is composed of
several sub-communities. Given the assortative network
structure, we hypothesized that certain firms will connect
these communities, providing the glue, which holds the
network together. These firms will also act as bridges that
transfer information and materials in the network. In this
section, we identify these key actors by using network
centrality measures and discuss how they impact the net-
work. While network-level measures such as average path
lengths and density provide macroscopic views of how the
overall structure is organized, centrality measures provide a
node-level view and examine how a certain node is
embedded within a network, helping us identify firms with
significant roles. Table 4 shows the companies scoring
highest in out-degree, in-degree, betweenness, and close-
ness centrality measures. Following Kim et al. [16] ter-
minology, we relate these measures to demand and supply
load, operational criticality, and informational dependence,
respectively. Several well-known automotive companies
score highest in in-degree and total degree, forming the top
of the network boundary. Overall, the correlation between
the degree centrality of a company and its product cen-
trality is 0.71. Therefore, it is highly likely that a supplier
with many numbers of products in its portfolio will also be
a hub in the network. However, the high correlation results
from the out-degree and product centrality (0.70) rather
than in-degree and product centrality (0.17). Suppliers with
highest demand loads are multi-national corporations.
Many of these, such as Magna and Denso, are not only
highly connected, but also appear to be operationally crit-
ical. Magna has many links to many assemblers, but also is
connected to high-degree suppliers such as Fuji Heavy,
Cherry and Dongfeng. It consolidates many products from
small suppliers and delivers goods downstream. If Magna
was disrupted, the disruption would quickly cascade to
multiple OEMs. Interestingly, it does not score highly in
closeness centrality, possibly because of its assortative
nature linking it to other Tier 1s but placing itself a hop
away from Tier 3s. Magna needs to be closer to its
extended network to be better informed of disruptions.
Examination of measures in the product network is
revealing. This network has a slightly higher clustering
coefficient, but average path length is not shorter than a
random network. Many products in the network are cou-
pled to one another. From a systems perspective, the sys-
tem is not highly modular, meaning that there is little
tolerance to disruptions to be contained within sub-systems
before they reach other parts of the assembly. In terms of
centrality measures scoring highly are usual suspects such
as simple connectors and sensors. These are also the
highest scoring in redundancy. It emerges that those
products that are critical for many systems are also those
products that have many suppliers.
3.3 Simulation of risk scenarios in the global
automotive industry
Due to lack of data on groups of companies or factory
locations and to exemplify as diverse set as possible, we
opt for the simulation of two main attack scenarios out of
the scenarios proposed in Table 3. These are progressive
targeted disruptions at companies and targeted disruptions
in countries. Figure 3 displays results. In the first scenario,
we attempted to cause the most damage with the least
removal of the nodes and thus select a targeted procedure.
The nodes are ranked according to their total degree cen-
trality and then nodes removed starting with the highest
ranked node. When nodes are removed, all of its links are
also removed. The size of LCC is observed upon each
successive removal. As nodes with highest degree are
removed, the largest component decreases and disappears
at the removed fraction f = 0.28, deforming into discon-
nected clusters (Fig. 2a). This value is typical of expo-
nential networks and is higher than scale-free networks but
lower than random networks [2]. The network will thus be
more tolerant to failures of highly connected nodes than a
scale-free network but less tolerant than random networks.
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The same pattern can be observed with the increase in the
average path length, which increases with the removal of
highly connected nodes as alternative paths are eliminated
(Fig. 2b). After the LCC disappears, the APL will tend to
infinity. Figures 4 and 5 show CFC and CFP as companies
are deleted. In both scenarios, damage caused by deletion
of individual companies are shown in decreasing loga-
rithmic scale. In CFC, the number of affected buyers
(Fig. 4a) and number of affected suppliers (Fig. 4b) are
shown. In CFP, the number of affected buyers’ products
(Fig. 5a) and number of affected supplier products
(Fig. 5b) are shown. Although in all cases third-degree
cascades are exponentially larger in terms of impact, not all
company deletions cause third-degree cascades. For
example, the average number of products affected during a
disruption at an individual supplier is 12 (Fig. 5b). The
average number on the second-degree-cascade-affected
products increases to an average of 101, and on third-de-
gree cascade, this number increases to 768. However, out
of all the suppliers, only the disruption of 0.002 % would
cause a third-degree cascading failure although the third-
degree cascading failure results in the loss of a large
Fig. 3 a Reduction in largest connected component size as nodes
with highest numbers of connections are targeted. b Increase in
average path length as nodes with highest numbers of connections are
targeted. c Reduction in largest component size and corresponding
increase in average path length as companies from different countries
are disrupted. Marker size is proportional to the number of companies
removed from a country. d Number of suppliers failing versus
assembly completeness if they are lost. Disruptions of majority will
have little impact as most of the assembly can still be procured from
elsewhere
Fig. 4 Number of affected a clients and b suppliers, as companies are deleted
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number of products. Additionally, it is not necessarily the
damage done by the first-degree disruption that determines
the total amount of damage. For example, Magna’s dis-
ruption would cause the most clients to be disrupted at the
first degree because this company has the largest client
base in the network. But when we look at second-degree
damage, i.e. the clients of clients that are disrupted,
Kamax’s failure is the most damaging, and at the third-
degree level, most damaging are Gibbs Die Corporation
and Michigan Spring and Stamping. Interestingly, Magna
also causes the most CFP damage at the first-degree level,
but at the third-degree level, ZF Friedrichshafen AG,
Panasonic Corporation, and Cummins Inc are most dam-
aging. For network-level robustness, highly connected
suppliers and suppliers with highest CFC and CFP levels
need to be made more robust. For individuals in the net-
work, the degree of spillover damage would depend on the
containment measures taken at each successive supplier.
Equally interesting lessons emerge when countries are
targeted for failure (Fig. 3c). China causes the highest
damage to the LCC, but relative to its size, does not
increase the average path length as much as Germany and
Japan does. This means that China has many nodes the
removal of which cause the size of LCC to decrease;
however, these nodes are at the periphery of the network
and thus are not highly connected. In contrast, Germany,
USA, and Japan have fewer nodes, but those nodes provide
most of the cohesiveness to the network. No single coun-
try’s removal results in the disappearance of the LCC. Of
course, note that many automotive assemblers such as
Ford, Volkswagen, and Toyota are from these countries, to
which many suppliers around the globe are connected,
whereas companies in China are mostly sub-tier producers.
When the AC is observed, no country except Japan and
Germany causes any loss. Disruptions in Japanese and
German suppliers result in an AC level of 0.98.
Next, we examine assembly completeness. Again we
attempt to cause the most damage with the least removal of
the nodes, in order to observe how fast breaking point
would occur. This time suppliers are ranked according to
their product centrality rather than degree centrality, with
the assumption that the removal of suppliers with many
products, rather than highly connected suppliers, would
likely result in disappearance of products necessary to
make the assembly. High-ranking suppliers are removed
successively, and AC is noted. The plotted distribution
shows the frequency of suppliers removed and the resulting
AC. It is observed that removal of the vast majority of
companies have little effect, whereas only a handful of
suppliers cause the assembly to be severely incomplete.
There is much redundancy in the network, and AC remains
robust to majority of supplier failures.
4 Concluding remarks
4.1 Summary of findings
Supply chains emerge as large-scale complex networks, the
interwoven topology of which makes them vulnerable to
systemic risk. At large scales, accurate robustness analysis
using operational details is not possible, not only because
the variable space becomes infeasible to be solved ana-
lytically, but also because operational details such as buffer
sizes, capacities, or throughput frequently change, making
the analysis not worthwhile. In this paper, we proposed a
network science-based framework as a powerful abstrac-
tion tool that captures some of the macroscopic features of
disruption dynamics. This simplification captures what
happens at the level of the network, rather than within the
individual members of the population. Contrary to prior
works, we used two network perspectives, namely those of
suppliers and those of products, for a more complete
analysis. The framework includes both existing and new
metrics to capture static robustness and dynamic response
to disruptions. We tested the framework with empirical
data from the global automotive industry. Several conclu-
sions have been drawn:
Fig. 5 Number of affected product instances a clients and b suppliers, as companies are deleted
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• Topological analysis showed that at large scales, the
supply chain is structured as a complex network with
multiple pathways between suppliers, rather than
hierarchically organized simple chains. Thus, network
science-based tools are appropriate for robustness
analysis of the system.
• The network has an exponential degree distribution in
terms of suppliers’ in-, out-, total degrees as well as the
product distribution among suppliers. This makes the
network vulnerable to failures on companies with
proportionally large numbers of clients, suppliers, total
number of links, and products. The network, however,
will be robust to random failures. As a comparison, the
network will be more robust to failures on such hubs
than on a scale-free network, but more vulnerable than
on a randomly organized network.
• Assortative nature of both the product’s and the
supplier’s network means that hubs tend to connect to
hubs, making cascades of disruptions more damaging
than that of disassortative networks.
• The supplier’s network is organized into communities,
with bridging suppliers connecting them. Disruptions at
these central firms need to be prevented to contain
cascades.
• If hubs fail in the supplier network, the largest
connected component quickly disappears forming the
network into disconnected clusters. Of course, in real
life the network can be rewired; however, this will
mean contractual rearrangements, which might take
time, and result in increased costs.
• Considering the LCC mechanism, the removal of single
countries do not result in the disconnection of the
network; hence, topologically speaking, the network is
robust to this kind of critical phenomena. However, the
node-level damage of country removal and rewiring
rates to avoid major catastrophes have not been
analysed.
• Examination of cascades of disruptions in the supplier
network showed that not only first-degree cascades but
further degrees need to be taken into account as
companies that score highly in first-degree damage are
not necessarily the same companies that may result in
secondary or tertiary damage. The degree to which
cascades can happen may be estimated using opera-
tional variables such as buffers.
• Both the topology of the supplier network and distri-
bution of production on the topology are important
components of robustness. While the network may be
topologically still connected, products that need to be
procured for the car assembly might disappear. In this
respect, our analysis showed that there is a high amount
of multi-sourcing, making the network robust to
supplier failures.
• The product network showed the existence of certain
central products, such as fuel filters, which have high
closeness centrality. Disruptions to the delivery of these
products will affect the assembly of many products
quickly, and these need to be carefully monitored.
Products such as pumps have high betweenness and
degree centrality. Although they have high redundancy
in the network, disruptions to their delivery would
cause issues for sub-systems to be brought together.
4.2 Limitations
Our results should be taken as a suggestive example due to
limitations concerning the dataset. These are:
• Data correspond to a cross-sectional map, with com-
panies advertising themselves as automotive parts
manufacturers. Hence, at least the raw material layer
is missing from the network.
• Data are agglomerative in that once a supply relation-
ship or production capability is declared, it remains in
the dataset, although ties can be broken and production
capabilities may change over time.
• Analysis on product capabilities used standard product
categories given by the dataset provider, the granularity
of which might affect the resulting robustness analysis.
For example, gearboxes for all models are grouped
under one category, whereas products for different car
models might vary. Robustness analysis using the
framework should include expert input for product
categorization to enable more accurate examination.
• By its nature, the framework offers an abstract analysis
that develops statistical insights at large scales for
which detailed operational data are not available.
Therefore, the framework does not require exact bills
of materials and material flow. Rather, it is aimed to
complement operational analysis with a minimal set of
parameters. For example, detailed analysis on a specific
producer could include a discrete event simulation-type
analysis. Our framework could serve as a statistical tool
that informs such analysis with likely disruption
cascades and vulnerabilities in the extended network.
4.3 Future outlook
Several avenues for future research are envisaged. First of
these is an extension of this study to include other risk
scenarios presented earlier and comparison with other
industrial networks. Second is the automation of data col-
lection. Current developments in intelligent products,
automated supply chain management systems, and the
Internet of Things can pave the way for intelligent systems
 1 Page 16 of 17 Logist. Res.  (2016) 9:1 
123
that automatically gather and analyse risk data from large-
scale supply networks in real time. Third, more studies
need to be conducted on the use of network science-based
analysis in supply chains. For example, after vulnerabilities
are highlighted at the large scale, operational details can be
introduced to pursue more in-depth questions such as levels
of inventory needed to prevent cascades of failures within
certain timeframes. Context-specific metrics that marry
network science and operations need to be developed for a
more complete understanding of robustness in supply
chains. Furthermore, while this study focused exclusively
on robustness properties of supply networks, the study of
resilience is also important. Longitudinal data would be
necessary to examine the relationship between structure
and dynamical response of supply networks to
perturbations.
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